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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the cooperation of states in Southeast Asia within the framework established by 
ASEAN, that is ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) to resolving the illicit 
trade of Small Arms and Light Weapon in the region. Most of existing works on the topic being stud-
ied put emphasize on the importance of the existence of norms, the role of institutions and security 
cooperation in resolving the illicit weapons trade. However, the existing studies have not explained 
why the existing form of cooperation has not been effective. By the approaching of international re-
gime theory, this article explains the interest based of regime that explain the background of regime 
formation which could influence state behavior to cooperate and successfully implement the rules of 
the international regime itself. The research applying qualitative research methods with data 
sourced from primary and secondary data from ASEAN official documents, books, journals, online 
news. This article shows that the effectivity of AMMTC to deal with the illicit Small Arms Trade is 
strongly influenced by the implementation commitment of the state members. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The threats to the state in the region 
evolve as the increasing interaction in in-
ternational relation. The threats are not 
only in the form of traditional security 
such as military threats, but also non-
traditional threats such as terrorism net-
works or transnational crime that could 
potentially trigger intrastate conflicts. 
One of transnational crime threat to the 
state in the region is illicit trafficking of 
the small and light weapons (Small Arms 
and Light Weapon, hereinafter abbreviat-
ed to SALW), which can be misused by 
any actor in the Southeast Asian region 
and implicate the stability of the region. 
For the period 2013 to 2017, as the global 
arms imports increase, the main recipient 
region was the Asia-Oceania by almost 
42% of global imports and 22% of its im-
ports received by Southeast Asia region 
(Wezeman & Et.al, 2018). Southeast Asian 
states alone are the second largest im-
porter of weapons to the Asian region 
from 2007 to 2014 (Holtom & Pavesi, 
2017). In addition, there is a connection 
between increased global arms trade and 
the risk of misuse and illicit trafficking of 
weapons. 
The circulation of SALW or its illicit 
trade in Southeast Asia itself can not be 
separated from the long history of war 
that occurred in the region. The remnants 
weapons of the conflict were exploited by 
irresponsible parties and ended up in the 
hands of non state actor, such as sepa-
ratist movement. Illicit SALW circulating 
in Southeast Asia were generally the rem-
nants of the Vietnam and Cambodian war 
that inherit about 2 million firearms and 
150,000 tons of ammunition utilized by 
the black market (Chouvy, 2013). The il-
licit SALW trafficking routes within 
Southeast Asia are through Myanmar, In-
donesia, Thailand, the Philippines and 
Malaysia (Nsia-Pepra & Pearson, 2009). 
The uncontrolled spread of SALW in 
Southeast Asia has several impacts, such 
as contributing to high levels of violent 
crime in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines and Thailand; insurgency in Aceh, 
Mindanao and Myanmar; increasing com-
munal conflict in Maluku; and impending 
development in Cambodia (Kramer, 
2001). 
In addition, the illicit trade of SALW 
in many Southeast Asian states is also in-
fluenced by the inability of the state to 
provide effective security for civilian and 
encourage them to have SALW as self-
defense, lack of rules regarding the exist-
ence of SALW, lack of institutions or 
mechanisms that effectively monitor and 
limit the acquisition and transfer of weap-
ons, as well as leaks in government arse-
nals (Pattugalan, 2004). These factors 
make ASEAN realized of the danger of 
threats from transnational crime that 
arise with the existence of this illicit trade 
of SALW to the process of integration and 
security of the Southeast Asian region. 
Southeast Asia’s states through ASEAN 
are committed in enhancing regional co-
operation to combatting transnational 
crime. The efforts undertaken by ASEAN 
are to adopt the ASEAN Declaration on 
Transnational Crime and establish the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transna-
tional Crime (AMMTC) (Lee, 2014). 
AMMTC becomes a discussion forum 
to solve transnational crime issues, espe-
cially related to illicit SALW circulation in 
the region. However, the meeting held 
every two years is still not fully able to 
solve the problem of illicit trade of SALW 
in the region. In addition, the AMMTC's 
ASEAN Plan of Action still focuses on oth-
er areas of transnational crime issues oth-
er than illicit SALW (ASEAN, 2017). On 
the other hand, the lack of rules and im-
plementation to resolve the phenomenon 
of illicit trade of SALW could have impli-
cations for the potential risks of unfin-
ished intrastate conflict, separatist and 
transnational crime network growth in 
each Southeast Asian states. During 2001 
to 2014, the amount of SALW circulation 
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that went into the region was not reduced 
showing that the implementation of the 
recommended rules by the region ap-
pears to be still not maximized (Holtom & 
Pavesi, 2017). The existence of an effec-
tive transnational crime resolving mecha-
nism is required to ensure security and 
stability within the region. The AMMTC 
that was established since the ASEAN 
Declaration on Transnational Crime in 
1997 and providing an information ex-
change meeting discussing transnational 
crime once every two years should be 
able to become an ASEAN effort in ad-
dressing transnational crime issues oc-
curring in the region, especially the illicit 
trade of SALW. The existing studies have 
not explained reasons behind the lack of 
implementation of the existing regional 
mechanisms on resolving the illicit trade 
of SALW in Southeast Asia. 
Previous studies on the circulation 
and illicit trade of SALWs in Southeast 
Asia through ASEAN generally see it from 
three perspectives namely (1) norms, (2) 
institutions, and (3) security. The study 
examining in terms of norm formation 
discusses ASEAN as an institution that 
acts as a norm shaping try to promote 
SALW norms in the region. However, 
ASEAN became an actor who localized 
SALW as a transnational crime issue and 
dismisses the possibility of sensitive in-
ternal issues, such as military and police 
involvement in unlawful SALW transfers 
with the intention of limiting the scope of 
the effectiveness of the norm (Capie, 
2008). ASEAN's awareness of taking re-
sponses to transnational crime had an im-
pact on the securitization of member 
states on its domestic issues  (Emmers, 
2003; Haacke & Williams, 2008; Nsia-
Pepra & Pearson, 2009). The securitiza-
tion of issues by the member states 
should not make ASEAN restrain the issue 
of illicit SALW circulation into transna-
tional or counter-terrorism criminal is-
sues to influence the effectiveness of 
SALW circulation norms in the region. 
The second perspective explains 
from the institutional point of view, which 
emphasizes that ASEAN as a regional or-
ganization in Southeast Asia recognizes 
the need to establish institutional instru-
ments in response to resolving the illicit 
trade of SALW. However, some efforts by 
ASEAN through the ASEAN Political Secu-
rity Community, AMMTC or ASEAN Re-
gional Forum are constrained by the 
state's domestic priorities (Haacke, 2009; 
Kartha, 1999; Lee, 2014). The last per-
spective of studies were non-conventional 
security threats and response mecha-
nisms. The problem of SALW's illicit trade 
in Southeast Asia is generally seen as a 
form of non-traditional crime involving 
actors of transnational crime network and 
closely connected to the inability of the 
state to exercise control as well as law en-
forcement in its sovereign territory 
(Bitzinger, 2013; Capie, 2008; Chouvy, 
2013; Efrat, 2010; Evans, 1988; Fee, 
1988; Pattugalan, 2004; Thachuk, 2007). 
The illicit trade of small arms, arms deal-
ers, smugglers, and corrupt officials are 
some of the key contacts that could possi-
bly encouraging the rise of trafficking 
connection and complex relation between 
transnational crime network with terror-
ist (Mullins & Wither, 2016). The resolv-
ing effort for illicit trade of SALW must be 
done by not only involving the national 
government of one state but also coordi-
nating cooperation with other states in 
the region. The uncontrolled of existing 
SALW all over the world has been a major 
factor in the increase in the number of 
conflicts and insecurity (Paoli & Ky-
tomaki, 2016). The circulation of SALW 
evolved from the remnants of the Vi-
etnam-Cambodian war and with the back-
ground of the political-economic motives 
that caused the circulation and the illicit 
trade of SALWs increase in Southeast 
Asia. This resulted in a long chain that left 
ASEAN member states still lacking effec-
tive resolution mechanisms in the case of 
SALW. 
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The three previous studies show the 
existence of norms and cooperation as an 
effort to resolve the circulation and illicit 
trade of SALW. However, the previous 
studies have not yet answered how the 
form and pattern of cooperation is imple-
mented to ensure the state is committed 
in implementing norms and resolving the 
illicit trade of SALW in Southeast Asia. For 
this reason, this paper uses the theory of 
the international regime as an analytical 
framework to enrich the previous studies 
to understand the forms of cooperation 
and regime patterns in solving the prob-
lem of illicit trade of SALW as well as the 
factors that influence the regime effectivi-
ty. Therefore, this paper is intended to 
answer the research question "Why 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transna-
tional Crime (AMMTC) has not been able 
to optimize its role on resolving the illicit 
trade of SALW in Southeast Asia?". To an-
swer that question, this paper uses varia-
bles in the international regime that will 
help explain existing rules that should be 
implemented by member states to resolve 
the issues of illicit trade of SALW that can 
be achieved optimally. In the next section, 
this paper will explain the research meth-
ods, theoretical framefork of international 
regime, an analysis of the implementation 
of the regime in the resolving of illicit 
trade of SALW, and conclusions. 
 RESEARCH METHODS 
This paper will use qualitative re-
search methods with data sourced from 
primary and secondary data. The authors 
collected research data starting from the 
existence of the ASEAN Declaration on 
Transnational Crime which seeks to re-
solving the illicit trade of SALW in 1997 
until the last meeting of AMMTC in 2017. 
The data was collected by conducting lit-
erature studies, news searches, especially 
from online media on the resolving of il-
licit SALW in Southeast Asia through 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transna-
tional Crime (AMMTC). After the data is 
collected, triangulation will be done in 
order to test the accuracy of the research 
result. Triangulation is done by checking 
the validity and reliability of data through 
the comparison of data sources obtained 
from books, journals, online and articles 
in accordance with research questions. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
International Regime 
The existence of international insti-
tutions encourages the formation of vari-
ous form of agreements that serve as the 
basic rules of the relations between 
states. One form of agreement that is used 
as a basic rule is the international regime. 
The international regime is a principle, 
norm, rule and decision-making process 
(Krasner, 1982). The development of 
studies on international regimes in inter-
national relations itself has existed since 
30 years ago through various works by 
Ernst B. Haas or Stephen D. Krasner 
(Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1996). 
Stephen D. Krasner defines regime 
as a set of principles, norms, rules and 
procedures for decision making, both ex-
plicit and implicit, in which actors expect 
to focus on a particular issue in interna-
tional relations. The regime is more spe-
cific to an issue and generally involves 
limited members of the international 
community (Krasner, 1982). Ernst B. Haas 
also explains that the regime's focus is on 
arrangements to work together on topics 
and issues that are considered complex 
and cause interdependence so that inter-
state cooperation is necessary although 
not a comprehensive cooperation be-
tween all states (Haas, 1980). 
Dirk Pulkowski also emphasize that 
the regime is a structure, not an actor. 
The regime is created by states, intergov-
ernmental organizations, and non-
governmental organizations in the pro-
cess of international socialization, which 
regulates common norms and principles 
to produce appropriate behavior on is-
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sues that reflect mutual interests 
(Pulkowski, 2014). Participation in the 
regime can encourage the same standard 
of behavior in dealing with an issue. Inter-
national regime form by states while the 
existence of a regime can also alter and 
shape state behavior through commit-
ment within the regime itself (Pulkowski, 
2014). Pulkowski explained that intergov-
ernmental organizations can act as inter-
national regime actors because interna-
tional organizations can act as institutions 
that propagate norms and models of good 
political behavior (Pulkowski, 2014). 
Krasner explains that if the princi-
ples, norms, rules, and procedures of deci-
sion-making of the regime become less 
coherent, or if the practice is inconsistent 
with principles, norms, rules and proce-
dures, then the regime has weakened. 
Changes in the regime occur when there 
is a change in rules and procedures of de-
cision-making, but not of norms or princi-
ples and the weakening of the regime oc-
curs when incompatibility between re-
gime components or inconsistencies be-
tween regimes and related behaviors 
(Krasner, 1982). Krasner also explains 
that there is a direct relationship between 
the background formation of the regime 
and the expecting behavior as in certain 
situations that are not fully conflicted, de-
cision makers may lead to optimal results 
that make the regime significant (Krasner, 
1982). Thus the factors behind the for-
mation of the regime can greatly affect the 
end behavior of actors. The success of a 
regime implementation depends on the 
cooperation between states in imple-
menting the regime. The cooperation is 
based on mutually agreed norms 
(Krasner, 1982). 
The same perspective also stated by 
the explanation of Andreas Hasenclever, 
Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger on the 
regime's effectiveness consisting of two 
ideas: first, the regime is effective as long 
as its members obey its norms and rules 
and secondly, an effective regime to the 
extent that it reaches a particular goal or 
fulfills its initial purpose (Hasenclever et 
al., 1996). As stated by Hasenclever, the 
existence of compliance mechanisms in-
fluence by the behavior of states in fol-
lowing the regime. Compliance mecha-
nisms can happen if it can eliminate the 
fear of potentially deceive by their part-
ners in the projected regime that has been 
agreed (Hasenclever et al., 1996). 
Hasenclever extend the understand-
ing of the regime by using a formal ap-
proach of the regime in which this ap-
proach was adopted into interest-based 
theories of regime derived from the de-
velopment of Robert Keohane's regime 
studies (Hasenclever, Mayer, & 
Rittberger, 2004). The regime's formal 
approach explained that the regime is 
considered as an explicit rule agreed upon 
by the actor and embodied in the agree-
ment or other document (Hasenclever et 
al., 2004). This approach will further indi-
cate the cause of the diversity of the 
regime's effectiveness. The interest-based 
theories of regime explain the state seek-
ing its own interests under the assurance 
that the regime maximizes the interests of 
all actors involved (Keohane, 1984). In 
the interest-based theories of regime 
there are two characteristics that can ex-
plain the formation of the regime. First, 
contractualism, studying the effects of in-
ternational regimes on the ability of ac-
tors to cooperate in dilemmatic situa-
tions. Second, situation-structuralisms, 
taking into strategic situation in which 
the actors may cooperate through the re-
gimes with the intent of analyzing the im-
plications of different constellation inter-
ests in the formation of regimes and insti-
tutional forms of the regime (Hasenclever 
et al., 2004). 
Factors in the regime's formal ap-
proach will be applied in the analysis of 
illicit trade of SALW in Southeast Asia. In-
terest-based shows state trying to achieve 
its interests over the security of its terri-
tory from the threat of illicit trade of 
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SALW. By analyzing those variables 
would be seen how the regime develops 
and should be applicable. The variables 
that will be used as the basic analysis in 
this paper are the variables of contractu-
alism, situation-structuralism in the inter-
est-based approach of the regime as de-
scribed previously by Hasenclever et.al. 
The success of the regime imple-
mentation was shown from the extent to 
which members behavior is in accordance 
with the rules and is strongly influenced 
by the reasons for the establishment of 
the regime itself. The regime is meant to 
facilitate the formation of agreements. 
Based on the analytical framework, this 
paper will explain the conformity of the 
illicit trade of SALW resolving policy im-
plementation produced by the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational 
Crime (AMMTC) based on the previously 
established regime-forming variables. 
In the next part of this paper will be 
analyzed the formal approach of the re-
gime applied in the interest-based theo-
ries of regime will see how the regime de-
velops and effective. It will be seen how 
variables in the interest-based theories of 
regime fulfilled so as to have an effect on 
the implementation of the regime itself. 
Hasenclever et.al explains the effective 
regime as long as its members abide by its 
rules and a regime reaches the goal of its 
initial formation. Thus the initial reason 
for the formation of a strong regime can 
affect the success rate itself. Furthermore, 
it will be explained according to the for-
mal approach regime, the resolving re-
gime of illicit trade of SALW through 
AMMTC could not be optimize because of 
inapplicable factors of interest-based in 
that regime. A further explanation of the 
interest-based in the illicit trade of SALW 
resolving efforts through the AMMTC will 
be explained in the following chapters. 
 
 
 
Interest-Based in Resolving Illicit 
Trade of SALW Through AMMTC  
Interest-based emphasizes the role 
of the international regime that helps 
states realize their common interests in 
which the state is portrayed as a rational 
actors who cares only for the it gains 
(Hasenclever et al., 1996). In this case, the 
illicit trade of SALW resolving regime em-
bodied by establishing the ASEAN Minis-
terial Meeting on Transnational Crime 
(AMMTC). The common interest to be 
achieved is to coordinate the behavior of 
the state in such a way that they can avoid 
the effects of the illicit trade of SALW. 
Interest-based assumes a rational 
state confronted with the possibility of 
achieving mutual interest from their ef-
fective behavioral coordination will suc-
cessfully solve the common problem of 
SALW's illicit trade threats. Thus the com-
mon interest encourages the state to 
make efforts to establish a set of specific 
norms and rules to deal with the illicit 
trade of SALW. The SALW's illicit trade 
threats pushes ASEAN as a regional or-
ganization in Southeast Asia to take re-
sponse and member states are expected 
to follow this response. However, the 
state is a rational actor who has a desire 
to achieve their own interests. The pur-
pose of the regime will not be achieved if 
the collective interests that have previ-
ously been the driving force behind the 
establishment of the regime are not co-
heren with the initial interests of each 
state. The regime's effort in resolving 
SALW's illicit trade through AMMTC's re-
gional mechanisms can be conflicted with 
the domestic interests of ASEAN member 
states themselves. 
The Interest-based of resolving SAL-
W's illicit trade through the AMMTC will 
further explain in two parts. The first sub-
chapter explains contractualism in the 
establishment regime of the ASEAN Dec-
laration on Transnational Crime 1997 
which shows the state's interest in resolv-
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ing SALW's illicit trade. While the second 
sub-chapter is situation-structuralisms 
that will show the strategic situation and 
the implications of the constellation of the 
interests of each actors in the resolving 
efforts by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
on Transnational Crime (AMMTC). 
Contractualism in the Formation of 
ASEAN Declaration on Transnational 
Crime 1997 as an International Regime 
Contractualism shows that the rea-
son the state cooperate on a particular 
issue through the regime is because the 
state shares a common interest that they 
can achieve only through cooperation 
(Hasenclever et al., 1996). To achieve 
state interest, it is necessary to cooperate 
and share common interests in the areas 
of issues of concern to the regime. In this 
case the common interest is to resolving 
the illicit trade of SALW in Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN is aware of the transnational 
crime issues, especially the illicit trade of 
SALW involving extensive networks be-
tween states in the region, requiring the 
regional cooperation not only one state 
effort. Contractualism shows that in gen-
eral, ASEAN member states have a com-
mon interest that encourages them to co-
operate to form a regime to solve SALW's 
problem through regional mechanisms. 
Despite that fact, some other state in 
Southeast Asia have different interests to 
the phenomenon of illicit trade of SALW 
itself. There are economic benefits from 
both legal and illicit trade of SALW (Nsia-
Pepra & Pearson, 2009). The arms traf-
ficking transaction in Southeast Asia in-
volves many intermediaries: traders and 
smugglers, criminals, government officials 
and intermediaries who coordinate the 
supply of weapons to various recipients 
(Nsia-Pepra & Pearson, 2009). In order to 
control the dissemination and illicit trade 
of SALW, alternative economic activities 
are needed to replace the attractiveness 
arising from SALW's illicit trade and ne-
gotiations needed for regional policy. 
ASEAN Declaration on Transnational 
Crime 1997 serves as a guideline for 
ASEAN member states to take measures 
to address the illicit trade of SALW in 
Southeast Asia. Through this declaration 
also emphasized the need for effective re-
gional rules to combat this issue, especial-
ly on the aspect of information exchange 
and policy coordination (ASEAN, 2012). 
The Declaration becomes an institutional 
framework for ASEAN cooperation on 
transnational crime by establishing the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transna-
tional Crime (AMMTC) which meets every 
two years to coordinate the activities of 
the relevant ASEAN bodies such as the 
ASEAN Chiefs of National Police 
(ASEANAPOL) (ASEAN, 2012). Further-
more, from the principles and rules that 
existed from the ASEAN Declaration on 
Transnational Crime 1997 then generated 
the ASEAN Action Plan on transnational 
crime which contains the program plan 
that will be applied by ASEAN and mem-
ber states in resolving problem of trans-
national crime (ASEAN, 2017). However, 
some efforts made by ASEAN through 
AMMTC are still constrained by domestic 
priorities of the states members. 
The growth of illicit trade of SALW 
was responsible for most deaths in the 
world's conflict. Southeast Asia were 
known to be a region that has a long his-
tory of conflict from the Indochina war, 
including the Wars in Vietnam, Laos, Cam-
bodia and Myanmar (Centre For Interna-
tional Law, 2017). Throughout the history 
of wars and conflicts within the region in 
Southeast Asia many have involved armed 
violence in every conflict (Chouvy, 2013). 
The history of the armed conflict has trig-
gered the existence of a highly active and 
regionally integrated SALW illicit trade. In 
the 1990s, Cambodia emerged as a re-
gional black market for SALW and its buy-
ers include Myanmar rebel groups, sepa-
ratists from Sri Lanka and supporters of 
the Aceh independence movement in In-
donesia (Chouvy, 2013). In March 2010, 
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thousands of grenades of ammunition and 
dozens of grenades vanished from the 
government arsenal in Phatthalung and 
the government claimed the weapons 
were used by red-shirt protesters in 
Bangkok (Chouvy, 2013).  
SALW which is a portable weapon, 
easy to carry and hidden was most de-
structive weapon. The existence of SALW 
made it responsible for 50-90% of victims 
in the civil war until now (Nsia-Pepra & 
Pearson, 2009). In addition to demand 
from buyers throughout the region, pov-
erty and economic problems, political cri-
ses, armed conflicts and natural disasters 
can encourage actors to smuggle and 
trade illicit SALW (Nsia-Pepra & Pearson, 
2009). Southeast Asia states only have the 
ability to develop and produce SALW, 
considering the fact that the market of 
SALW itself becomes important to sup-
port the domestic supply and the state's 
economic sector of defence industry 
(Bitzinger, 2013). But the absence of 
SALW rules itself facilitates access to the 
illicit trade of SALW (Pattugalan, 2004). 
The existence of illicit weapons 
trade can disrupt the state's stability. 
States see illicit trade activities as a major 
threat because smugglers and traffickers 
have impact on state legitimacy by ques-
tioning the state’s ability to control its 
own territory (Chouvy, 2013). The weap-
ons of the remnants of the conflict and the 
war are exploited by irresponsible parties 
and end up in the hands of the parties. In 
this context it is seen that the common 
interest of ASEAN member states is the 
need to resolve the threat of transnational 
crime, especially the illicit trade of SALW 
in Southeast Asia. With the complexity of 
SALW's existing circulation and trade 
problems in Southeast Asia since the end 
of Indochina's prolonged conflict, regional 
efforts are needed to resolve the issue. 
This is because there are still many poten-
tial conflicts that have not been fully re-
solved and the existence of illicit trade of 
SALW may increase the risk of potential 
threats to conflict within states and trans-
national crime activities that threaten the 
stability of the region. 
The common interest emphasized by 
contractualism in the ASEAN Declaration 
on Transnational Crime 1997 is the need 
for resolving the illicit trade in SALW re-
gionally. With consideration of the threat 
to the stability of the region with the ex-
istence of SALW’s illicit trade. However, 
as Hasenclever et.al stated in an interest-
based understanding that the state is a 
rationalist actor who only wants to max-
imize their interests. Therefore, the com-
mon interest which initially became the 
driving force behind the establishment of 
the SALW illicit trade resolving regime 
through the AMMTC could not be opti-
mized. 
The AMMTC already has an action 
plan as an effort to resolving the transna-
tional crime issues, including illicit trade 
of SALW would possibly conflicted with 
domestic state interests. ASEAN member 
states face different threats that make 
them have different definitions of the pri-
ority of resolving security threats (Lee, 
2014). The majority of ASEAN states are 
still focusing on the resolving of crimes 
such as drug trafficking and terrorism as 
for that the effort on resolving illicit trade 
of SALW becomes less than optimal (Lee, 
2014). In addition, the poverty and the 
development gap were still a priority of 
the main interests of majority ASEAN 
member states, causing AMMTC regional 
efforts made less than the maximum. The 
common interest that can encourage the 
regime is difficult to achieve because 
states do not share the same aspect of 
contractualism in term of common inter-
ests. With these differences of interest, 
the AMMTC is only meeting to discuss se-
curity issues without being able to en-
courage cstates to follow the recommen-
dation action plan. 
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Situation-Structuralism in the For-
mation of ASEAN Declaration on Trans-
national Crime 1997 as an Internation-
al Regime 
The Situation-structuralism broaden 
the perspective adopted in contractualism 
by considering the strategic situation in 
which actors may cooperate through the 
regime, and analyze the implications of 
different constellation of interests for the 
possibility of regime formation as well as 
for institutional form of the regime 
(Hasenclever et al., 1996). The regime 
may become relevant depending on the 
strategic situation underlying the exist-
ence of the regime itself. In this case of the 
strategic situation, explain the condition 
in which the need to address the threat of 
illicit trade of SALW. According to the sit-
uation-structuralism, in every particular 
strategic situation requires different 
treatment to achieve the relevant regime 
(Hasenclever et al., 1996). The strategic 
situation has encouraged ASEAN member 
states to sign agreements in the ASEAN 
Declaration on Transnational Crime 1997 
to coopereate towards enhancing cooper-
ation in the resolving of transnational 
crime issues. The situation also prompted 
the states that referred to the declaration 
to form the AMMTC and were willing to 
hold meetings every two years discussing 
transnational crime issues. 
The situation which is critically con-
sidered regional urgency at that time indi-
rectly encourages member states to col-
lectively agree on the resolving illicit 
trade of SALW which is included in the 
framework of resolving transnational 
crime. Hasenclever et. al explained in the 
situation-structuralism there is a critical 
situation which states should agree on a 
clear order that determines the appropri-
ate behavior under the regime. In order to 
that situation, they must develop proce-
dures that convince the actor that the 
possibility of being cheated by other party 
was unlikely (Hasenclever et al., 1996). In 
situation-structuralism there is possible 
solution to the regime's effectiveness with 
regime collaboration involving the role of 
international organizations to ensure the 
suitability of behavior with regime or co-
ordination of the regime that will contin-
ue to cooperate despite the fact that only 
a few states continue to follow the rules of 
the regime so that the overall compliance 
element not entirely necessary. However, 
this does not fully work within the frame-
work of ASEAN where ASEAN is a region-
al organization that uses intragovernmen-
tal systems (Tripathi, 2015). Thus no one 
can encourage the state and assert explic-
itly that the rules of the regime have been 
implemented accordingly because in the 
mechanism of ASEAN there is no ultimate 
authority above the state. 
Both solutions offered by situation-
structuralism can be a strategic situation 
that encourages the effectiveness of the 
regime although there are various con-
stellations of interests not fully able to 
work in this ASEAN mechanism. AMMTC 
is only facilitating ASEAN member states 
to discuss the transnational crime issues 
facing their respective states and expect a 
recommendation of resolution mecha-
nisms with the assistance of regional co-
ordination (ASEAN, 2015). Coordination 
of the regime will be difficult to achieve 
because the resolving illicit trade of SALW 
requires joint settlement not just compli-
ance from one state. Resolving illicit trade 
of SALW involves a cross boundary net-
work and there is a risk of the inability of 
the state to enforce the law in its territory 
that causes the illicit trade to increase in 
Southeast Asia. The regional mechanism 
has purpose to help states enforce the law 
to overcome illicit trade of SALW. There-
by expecting incomplete compliance simi-
larly to let the illicit trade of SALW contin-
ue to grow. 
Another possibility of a situation-
structuralism is the collaboration of the 
regime with international organizations 
in which ASEAN becomes a regional or-
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ganization facilitating the establishment 
regime to resolving the illicit trade of 
SALW through the AMMTC. But the func-
tion of international organizations that 
should be able to force states to abide by 
the rules of the regime itself is con-
strained by ASEAN's non-interference and 
intergovermental principles. The regime 
intended to facilitate the exchange of in-
formation about the existence of SALW in 
the region becomes difficult because 
AMMTC itself is only a communication 
forum and can not encourage the state to 
be fully transparent on the circulation of 
its transfer SALW. The AMMTC can only 
provide recommendations for joint policy 
coordination that member states can en-
gage in armed trafficking but there is no 
enforcement mechanism that will ensure 
member states comply with the collective 
agreement. 
The contractualism and situation-
structuralism shows that the actors are 
well aware of their interests and the pref-
erence in the formation of cooperation is 
very influential on the negotiations be-
tween states (Hasenclever et al., 1996). 
Both components indicate that the im-
portance of the state is very influential on 
the regime that will affect the success of 
cooperation that became the goal of the 
regime itself. The influence of different 
constellations of interests and situations 
underlying different regimes led to the 
resolving of SALW's illicit trade through 
AMMTC is indeed difficult. Member states 
are still focused on their respective do-
mestic interests so that the elements of 
regulatory compliance are difficult to ful-
fill. In addition, the characteristic of 
ASEAN itself which is an intergovernmen-
tal regional organization can not force its 
member states to fully prioritize the prob-
lem of illicit trade of SALW compared to 
other transnational crime issues. 
ASEAN recognizes the need for re-
gional stability and security that will im-
pact on the security of ASEAN member 
states. However, with only bianuall meet-
ing AMMTC is less able to maximize its 
role in coordinating the illicit trade of 
SALW resolving policy. In several AMMTC 
meetings the focus of the agenda is on ter-
rorism in the region (ASEAN, 2017). The 
problem of SALW's illicit trade is indeed 
one of the components of the AMMTC it-
self but in reality, the action plans and 
policy recommendations issued focus 
more on the issue of transnational crimes 
other than the SALW black trade. 
AMMTC effort on resolving illicit 
trade of SALW include the exchange of 
information to establish compilations of 
ASEAN member states laws and regula-
tions relating to arms smuggling, enhanc-
ing information exchange and coopera-
tion among ASEAN officials such as 
ASEANAPOL, customs and regulators leg-
islation on weapons smuggling activities. 
In addition, AMMTC also coordinates with 
ASEANAPOL on information about SAL-
W's illicit trade activities, enhancing addi-
tional regional cooperation programs in-
cluding enhancing information exchange 
with ASEAN dialogue partners, relevant 
regional organizations and relevant UN 
agencies (POA-ISS, 2005). The coopera-
tion is intended to share important infor-
mation about the identity, movements 
and activities of transnational criminal 
organizations known to be involved in 
illicit trade of SALW. 
The resolving effort can not de-
crease the amount of illicit trade of SALW 
in Southeast Asia. Based on the data 
above, there is an increasing value of 
small arms supplied to Southeast Asia and 
the annual average value of the SALW 
flows to Southeast Asia during 2001 to 
2014 reach to USD 214 million where In-
donesia and Thailand are the main im-
porters (Holtom & Pavesi, 2017). Parts of 
Southeast Asian imports represented 5% 
of global arms imports in 2001, but in-
creased by 36% in 2014 (Holtom & Pave-
si, 2017). Throughout 2001 to 2014, SAL-
W's entry into the region did not diminish 
(Holtom & Pavesi, 2017). There is connec-
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tion between legal and illicit trade of 
SALW where an increase in the number of 
legal SALW circulations implies an in-
crease in the number of illicit traffic of 
SALW (Nsia-Pepra & Pearson, 2009). In 
addition, the legal SALW traffic circulars 
have similarities with illicit trade of SALW 
routes through Myanmar, Cambodia, 
Laos, Indonesia and Thailand (Nsia-Pepra 
& Pearson, 2009). In the absence of SALW 
circulation rules and a lack of state capa-
bility to enforce the law relating to leak-
age of government arsenal and misbehav-
ior of officials causing circulation of SALW 
has the potential to fall into illicit trade of 
SALW. 
Based on these data it can be seen 
that the role of AMMTC in resolving illicit 
trade of SALW was still not optimal. Dur-
ing its existence since ASEAN Declaration 
on Transnational Crime 1997 until now 
the resolving efforts of illicit trade in 
SALW still has not shown significant con-
trasting results with the increasing poten-
tial of threats. AMMTC that should be able 
to meet the needs of ASEAN member 
states by conducting meeting every two 
years as an effort to exchange information 
solving the problem of transnational 
crime. However, ASEAN Ministerial Meet-
ing on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) role 
can not be optimize as states do not fully 
cooperate in solving the illicit trade of 
SALW. It shows that the components in 
the formation of the regime that should 
be fulfilled to make the regime significant 
were not fulfilled in that cases no compli-
ance of AMMTC policy implementation 
through its action plan. 
 CONCLUSION 
From the description above, this pa-
per shows that the resolving illicit trade 
of small arms and light weapon (SALW) in 
Southeast Asia through AMMTC can be 
analyzed by looking at the formal ap-
proach of the regime applied in the inter-
est-based theories of regime that show 
the development of the regime and the 
factors behind the formation of the re-
gime until it can take effect. Interest-
based in the regime shows that the con-
tractual component of common interests 
that should be able to drive the success of 
the regime does not appear in the rela-
tions among ASEAN member states them-
selves. Common interests that should ex-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Value of Small Arms Supplied to Southeast Asia, as Reported to UN Comtrade 
(USD Million) 2001-2014 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from NISAT by Holtom & Pavesi, 2017 
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ist clash with the interests of domestic 
priorities of each ASEAN member states. 
In addition to the situation-structuralism 
indicates that the underlying strategic sit-
uation is the need for resolving illicit 
trade of SALW that has the potential to 
threaten the security and stability of the 
region.  
The constellation of interests that 
the regime should be able to accommo-
date, can not work on the framework of 
ASEAN which has the form of intergov-
ernmental organization so that there is no 
mechanism that can ensure member 
states apply the regime in accordance 
with its provisions. The AMMTC is a state 
tools for resolving the transnational crime 
issues that include the resolving of SAL-
W's illicit trade. AMMTC undertook SAL-
W's illicit trade efforts by issuing action 
plans that support the establishment of 
inter-state cooperation in resolving SAL-
W's illicit trade. However, the diverse in-
terests of the state have an impact on the 
difficulty of conducting cooperation in ac-
cordance with the provisions recom-
mended by AMMTC. 
From the explanation, it is seen that 
the existing mechanism is not optimal be-
cause of the existence of different inter-
ests have an impact on the difficulty of the 
state to cooperate. Components in inter-
est-based should be well met so as to pro-
duce an effective regime. However, the 
state is an rationalist actor who prioritiz-
es their own interests so that the common 
interest element does not appear in the 
relationship between ASEAN members in 
terms of resolving illicit trade of SALW. 
The findings in this study indicate 
that the effectiveness of the regime de-
pends heavily on members who obey the 
norms and rules and the achievement of a 
particular goal or fulfillment of initial 
goals of the regime. In the context of the 
resolving of illicit trade in SALW, not all 
ASEAN member states regard this issue as 
a regional priority have an impact on 
some AMMTC agendas to resolving illicit 
trade of SALW were limited to only form 
of a cooperative recommendation unlike 
other transnational issues. Therefore, it 
would be best suggestion in order to opti-
mize the resolving effort of illicit trade in 
SALW by AMMTC if ASEAN member 
states fully comply and commit to priori-
tize the resolving of this issues. 
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